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JUVENILE COURT BINDOVER HEARINGS 
Paul C. Giannelli JAN 
Albert 'J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
On July 1 , 1994 extensive amendments to the Ohio Rules protect." P. Piersma, J. Ganousis, A. Volenik, H. Swanger & 
Jf Juvenile Procedure,became effective. One of the most P. Connell, Law and Tactics in Juvenile Cases 27 4 (3d ed. 
mportant rules, as well as one of the most controversial, is 1977). 
~ule 30 which governs "bindover" proceedings. This proce-
jure, also known as transfer, refers to the process by which 
1 juvenile court relinquishes jurisdiction and transfers a 
jelinquency case to the criminal courts for prosecution. In 
)hio juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction over persons 
mder the age of 18 who are charged with criminal conduct. 
~.C. 2151.23(A)(I). However, a juvenile 15-17 years of age 
vho has been charged with a felony may be "boundover" to 
he criminal court for trial as an adult. 
Bindover is unique to juvenile courts. "There is no pro-
:eeding for adults comparable directly to the juvenile juris-
liction waiver hearing." Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F..2d 169, 
73 (4th Cir. 1970). It is part "preliminary hearing" and part 
sentencing hearing:' 
Bindover procedures have been part of the juvenile court 
;ystem since the turn of the century, when the first juvenile 
:ourts were established in this country. Virtually every state 
>as some type of bindover procedure. Nevertheless, the 
>rocedure remains controversial. The concept of bindover 
mtails an implicit recognition that the juvenile court system 
;hould not be available to all children: 
Some acts are so offensive to the community that the 
arbitrary line drawn at eighteen cannot acceptably be 
used to protect the alleged wrongdoer. The serious 
offender should not be permitted to escape the criminal 
justice system simply because he or she is a day or a 
year short of eighteen. As age eighteen approaches, 
credible argument can be made that the juvenile court's 
always inadequate resources should not be devoted to 
those youthful wrongdoers whose offenses are so seri-
ous or who appear to be so incorrigible as to be unwor-
thy of or beyond help. IJA-ABA Standards Relating to 
Transfer Between Courts 3 (1980). 
This view of transfer proceedings is not universally 
.ccepted: "Others argue that the existence of this loophole 
ransfer] in the juvenile system indicates a half-hearted 
ommitment to treatment and a continued allegiance to ret-
ibution on the part of society, an allegiance that is particu-
lrly distasteful because it applies to the very persons 
thorn the separate juvenile court system was designed to 
CONSTITUTIONAl ISSUES 
Procedural Due Process 
In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the United 
States Supreme Court considered a challenge to transfer 
proceedings conducted pursuant to the D.C. Code. Kent 
was taken into custody for rape. As a 16 year old, he was 
subject to juvenile court jurisdiction. The juvenile court, 
however, transferred his case for trial as an adult. The 
transfer was accomplished without a hearing or written rea-
sons. In addition, the juvenile court failed to provide Kent's 
attorney with access to Kent's social service file. 
On review, the Supreme Court held that the transfer pro-
ceedings were invalid. According to the Court, transfer is a 
"critically important" stage of the juvenile process and "there 
is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of 
such tremendous consequences without ceremony - with-
out hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without 
a statement of reasons." /d. at 554. 
Whether the Court intended to rest its decision in Kent on 
statutory or constitutional grounds is not entirely clear. At 
one point in the opinion, Justice Fortas wrote: "The 
Juvenile Court Act and the decisions of the United States 
Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia Circuit provide 
an adequate basis for decision of this case, and we go no 
further." /d. at 556. Nevertheless, other parts of the opinion 
indicate a constitutional basis. One passage reads: "We 
believe that this result is required by the statute read in the 
context of constitutional principles relating to due process 
and the assistance of counsel." /d. at 557. In another pas-
sage, the Court wrote that a transfer hearing "must mea-
sure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment." 
/d. at 562. 
A year after Kent was decided, the Supreme Court in In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), revolutionized juvenile court 
procedure by applying due process safeguards to delin-
quency hearings. The Court ruled: "[N]either the 
Fourteenth Amendment [due process] nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone." /d. at 13. The Court also quoted the 
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Kent passage on due process and then wrote: "We reiter-
ate this view ... as a requirement which is part of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our 
Constitution." /d. at 3Q-31. 
Most courts now view Kent as establishing constitutional 
standards for bindover. For example, the Third Circuit has 
stated: "[l]t is our view that Kent, particularly in light of the 
Supreme Court's subsequent opinion in In re Gault ... sets 
forth certain principles of constitutional dimension." United 
States ex rei. Turner v. Rundle, 438 F.2d 839, 841-42 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
The Ohio courts have repeatedly treated Kent as a consti-
tutional case. See State v. Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 127 
n.4, 431 N.E.2d 326, 331 n.4 (1982); State v. Taylor, 26 Ohio 
App.3d 69, 498 N.E.2d 211 (1985); State v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio 
App.3d 168, 170, 450 N.E.2d 700, 703 (1982); State v. Riggins, 
68 Ohio App.2d I, 6, 426 N.E.2d 504, 508 (1980); In re Mack, 
22 Ohio App.2d 201, 203, 260 N.E.2d 619, 621 (1970). 
Bindover Criteria 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, has yet to consider the 
constitutionality of the standards used in bindover proceed-
ings. Kent involved procedural due process, not the substan-
tive standard used to transfer a juvenile to criminal court. In 
Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the Court commented 
that it "has never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the 
nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a deci-
sion to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court." /d. at 537. 
Constitutional challenges to transfer statutes typically 
have been based on vagueness grounds, but these chal-
lenges generally have failed. E.g., Speck v. Auger, 558 F.2d 
394 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 999 (1977); Donald L. v. 
Superior Court, 498 P.2d 1098, 1104 (Cal. 1972); People v. 
Fields, 199 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Mich.l972), aff'd on rehearing, 
216 N.W.2d 51 (Mich.l974). 
OHIO PROCEDURES 
Ohio bindover proceedings are governed by R.C. 2151.26 
and Juvenile Rule 30. The 1994 amendments have 
reduced the differences between these two provisions. 
Even prior to these amendments, however, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had indicated that the statute and rule 
should be construed together. See State v. Douglas, 20 
Ohio St.3d 34, 35, 485 N.E.2d 711 (1985) ("R.C. 2151.26 
and Juv. R. 30 set forth the procedure to be followed by a 
juvenile court in a bind-over situation."). 
Generally, only a properly transferred juvenile may be 
prosecuted in the criminal courts. A prosecution in criminal 
court on the mistaken belief that the child was over 18 at the 
time of the offense is a "nullity." R.C. 2151.26(E). Moreover, 
"mailure to comply with the provisions of R.C. 2151.26 ... de-
prives the Court of Common Pleas of jurisdiction over a juve-
nile defendant." State v. Riggins, 68 Ohio App.2d I, 4, 426 
N.E.2d 504, 507 (1980). Accord State v. Taylor, 26 Ohio 
App.3d 69, 498 N.E.2d 211 (1985) (Failure to comply with no-
tice requirements deprives the criminal court of jurisdiction.) 
JUVENilES SUBJECT TO TRANSFER 
The statute and Rule 30 specify which juveniles are 
subject to bindover and the applicable criteria for making 
discretionary bindover decisions. Before a juvenile may be 
transferred, the court must find that (1) there is probable 
cause to believe that the juvenile has committed the alleged 
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act, (2) the act would be a felony if committed by an adult, 
and (3) the child was 15 years or older. The child's age at 
the time of the offense, rather than at the time of the trans-
fer hearing, controls. ! 
The age requirement can cause unexpected results. For t~ 
example,.in In re C, Alleged Delinquent Child, 61 Ohio '~( 
Misc.2d 610, 580 N.E.2d 1182 (C.P. 1991 ), the "delinquent" 
was not charged until after he was 21 years of age. The 
rape was alleged to have been committed when the "juve-
nile" was 14 years of age. A motion for bindover was dis-
missed because he was not 15 years old at the time of the 
alleged conduct. /d. at 612. The court also ruled that it 
lacked jurisdiction over the child at this time and therefore 
could not adjudicate the case. /d. at 614. 
DISCRETIONARY TRANSFER 
The most common type of transfer is discretionary trans-
fer. In this situation, the court must find that there are rea-
sonable grounds to believe (1) that the child is not 
amenable to care or rehabilitation or further care or rehabili-
tation in any facility for delinquent juveniles, and (2) that the 
safety of the community may require legal restraint for a 
period extending beyond his majority. R.C. 2151.26(A)(1 ); 
Juv. R. 30(D). 
Juvenile Rule 30: Enumerated Factors 
Amended Rule 30(F) requires the court to consider the 
following factors in determining whether a child is amenable 
to treatment: (1) age, (2) mental-physical condition, (3) 
prior juvenile record, (4) prior attempts at rehabilitation, (5) 
family environment, (6) school record, and (7) the specific 
facts of the offense. These factors have been applied in 
numerous Ohio cases: 
(1) Age: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 94, 547 
N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("Because of a juvenile's age, there 
may not be sufficient time remaining for rehabilitation to 
take place before the twenty-first birthday, even though the 
juvenile is otherwise amenable to rehabilitation."); State v. 
Ruple, No. 15726 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 8-4-93) at 5 ("sixteen 
years and seven months old at the time of the incident"). 
(2) Mental-physical condition: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio 
St.3d 93, 94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("[N]o evidence of 
any psychiatric disorder."); State v. McDonald, No. 11228 
(2d Dist. Ct. App., 6-5-90) at 12 ("psychological tests 'sug-
gested' that the appellant was intensely hostile and destruc-
tive, and had a 'sadistic potential"'). 
(3) Prior juvenile record: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 
93, 94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("[N]o record of trouble with 
juvenile authorities."); State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 
36, 485 N.E.2d 711, 713 (1985) ("lengthy prior juvenile 
record"); State v. Carter, 27 Ohio St.2d 135, 138, 272 N.E.2d 
119, 121 (1971)("many court appearances"); State v. Houston, 
70 Ohio App.3d 152, 156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (1990) ("previous 
juvenile record from Michigan"). 
(4) Previous efforts to treat or rehabilitate: State v. Carter, 
27 Ohio St.2d 135, 138, 272 N.E.2d 119, 121 (1971)(prior com-
mitment to correctional school); State v. Parks, 51 Ohio 
App.3d 194, 197, 555 N.E.2d 671 (1988) (prior sentence to 
juvenile facility at Riverview Center and prior stay at 
Columbus juvenile facility marked by fights and poor atti-
tude); State v. Whiteside, 6 Ohio App.3d 30, 35, 452 N.E.2d 
332, 338 (1982)(prior treatment at the Ohio Youth 
Commission); State v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio App.3d 168, 171, 450 
N.E.2d 700, 704 (1982)(prior probation). 
(5) Family environment: State v. Houston, 70 Ohio 
App.3d 152, 156, 570 N.E.2d 839 (1990) ("Appellant's 
home situation was less than ideal, and little assistance 
could be expected from his family."); State v. Ruple, No. 
15726 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 8-4-93) at 5 ("While Ruple's family 
environment was good, he had associated himself with 
friends with whom he had engaged in criminal behavior."); 
State v. Hawkins, No. 3462 (9th Dist. Ct. App., 6-8-
83)(unstable family situation). 
(6) School record: State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 
94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 (1989) ("[A)verage student who had 
not caused' major discipline problems."); State v. Houston, 
70 Ohio App.3d 152, 156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (1990) 
("Appellant's school attendance was abysmal and his 
grades were poor."); State v. Hawkins, No. 3462 (9th Dist. 
Ct. App., 6-8-83)(suspended from school 8 times). 
(7) Specific facts of the offense that are relevant to physi-
cal and mental condition. This factor was added in 1994 in 
response to the Watson case, which is discussed below. 
Supreme Court Cases 
The Ohio Supreme Court has discussed the bindover 
issue several times. 
State v. Carmichael (1973) 
In State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 
(1973) (syllabus 1 ), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161 (197 4), the 
Court recognized that the juvenile court "should have con-
siderable latitude within which to determine whether it 
should retain jurisdiction." /d. (syllabus). Moreover, the 
statutorily-required investigation "is not required to show 
~. that the child cannot be rehabilitated as a juvenile but only 
· that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he cannot 
be rehabilitated." /d. at 6. 
State v. Douglas (1985) 
In State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 485 N.E.2d 711 , 
713 (1985), the Court ruled: 
Neither R.C. 2151.25 nor Juv. R. 30 requires the juve-
nile court to make written findings as to the five factors 
listed in Juv. R. 30(E) [current (F) which lists 6 factors]. 
The rule simply requires the court to consider these fac-
tors in making its determination on the amenability 
issue. Although the better practice would be to address 
each factor, as long as sufficient, credible evidence per-
taining to each factor exists in the record before the 
court, the bind-over order should not be reversed in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion. /d. at 36. 
The Court also noted that "there is no requirement that 
each of the five factors be resolved against the juvenile." /d. 
at 37 (citing State v. Oviedo, 5 Ohio App.3d 168, 171, 450 
N.E.2d 700 (1982)). 
State v. Watson (1989) 
In State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 547 N.E.2d 1181 
(1989}, the defendant appealed the decision to transfer him 
to criminal court, where he was tried for aggravated murder 
and aggravated robbery. He argued that "amenability to 
treatment" must be determined solely by reference to the 
factors listed in Rule 30(F} [then Rule 30(E) which listed 
only 5 factors]. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, 
stating that "[t]here is no requirement that each, or any, of 
the five factors in Rule 30(E) be resolved against the juve-
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nile so long as the totality of the evidence supports a finding 
that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment." /d. at 95. 
The Court added: 
Rule 30 calls for a broad assessment of individual cir-
cumstances. Mechanical application of a rigidly defined 
test would not serve the purposes of the public or the 
juvenile. Further, reduction of the bindover decision to 
a formula would constrain desirable judicial discretion. 
We agree with appellant that Rule 30(E) [now (F)] 
requires consideration of all the listed factors, but we 
discern nothing in the rule, or in the policy it serves, 
which prohibits consideration of other relevant factors. 
/d. at 95-96. 
The Court went on to rule that the "seriousness of the 
alleged offense" is a valid factor in determining a juvenile's 
amenability to care or rehabilitation in the juvenile court sys-
tem. Again, the court noted that "the juvenile court enjoys 
wide latitude to retain or relinquish jurisdiction, and the ulti-
mate decision lies within its sound discretion." /d. 95. 
1994 Amendment 
A 1994 amendment to Rule 30 added a sixth factor to 
reflect the Court's decision in Watson. Rule 30(F)(6) pro-
vides that "the specific facts relating to the offense for which 
probable cause was found, to the extent relevant to the 
child's physical or mental condition" is a proper considera-
tion. The Staff Note (1994) includes the following caution: 
"While there is a danger that taking note of the facts sur-
rounding a particularly heinous crime could prejudice a 
court's deliberations on the rehabilitation question, the 
Supreme Court of Ohio approved a court's ability to consid-
er the totality of the circumstances which have brought the 
juvenile before the court in State v. Watson .... " 
Safety of the Community 
In evaluating the "safety of the community," the court may 
consider the nature of the offense, the existence of aggra-
vating circumstances, and the extent of any apparent pat-
tern of anti-social conduct. See State v. Carter, 27 Ohio 
St.2d 135, 136, 272 N.E.2d 119, 120 (1971) Uuvenile court cited 
aggravated character of offense - armed robbery - in the 
transfer order). 
In State v. Michael, No. 91-C-39 (7th Dist. Ct. App., 7-23-
93}, the juvenile was charged with nine counts, including 
aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and other crimes. 
On appeal, the court upheld the decision to transfer: 
The juvenile court obviously relied heavily on the seri-
ous and sometimes violent nature of the offenses with 
which appellant was charged. Having considered all fac-
tors, but having placed greater weight on the factors deal-
ing with the violent nature of the crimes, it cannot be 
found that the juvenile court abused its discretion in 
ordering that appellant be tried as an adult. /d. at 4. 
R.C. 2151.26(8) requires the court to consider, as an 
aggravating factor, whether the victim of the alleged offense 
was 65 years of age or older or was permanently or totally 
disabled at the time of the offense. See State v. Hurst, No. 
89-C-34 (7th Dist. Ct. App., 8-15-90} at 7 ("We find that the 
trial court properly considered the nature of the offense, the 
violence involved, and the fact that the victim was eighty-six 
years of age."). 
HEARING AND INVESTIGATION 
R.C. 2151.26 and Rule 30 require an investigation and a 
hearing as a prerequisite to transfer. In Kent the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that "an opportunity for a hearing 
which may be informal, must be given the child prior to 
entry of a waiver order." 383 U.S. at 561. In explaining the 
hearing requirement, the Court wrote: "We do not mean by 
this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform 
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the 
usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hear-
ing must measure up to the essentials of due process and 
fair treatment." /d. at 562. 
Probable Cause Hearing 
Rule 30 establishes a two-step hearing procedure. First, 
a preliminary hearing is held to determine whether there is 
probable cause to believe the child has committed a felony. 
The child, the prosecutor, or the court may move for a pre-
liminary hearing. If the court finds probable cause, the pro-
ceedings are continued until a full investigation is completed, 
at which time a second hearing is held to determine whether 
jurisdiction should be transferred to the criminal courts. 
Amenability Hearing 
The focus of the second hearing is the amenability of the 
child to rehabilitation in the juvenile court system. A social 
history may be prepared and used for this purpose. Juv. R. 
32(A)(2). 
It is unclear whether a juvenile can waive the transfer 
investigation and hearing. In State v. Newton, No. F-82-17 
(6th Dist. Ct. App., 6-10-83), the court held that the investi-
gation and hearing cannot be waived. Once probable 
cause is found at the preliminary hearing, 
a full investigation is required and a hearing must be 
held on the matter to determine whether the court 
should transfer jurisdiction to the trial court. At least one 
purpose of this hearing is to create a record in which the 
factual basis of the transfer order might be shown. 
Therefore, we conclude that the Juvenile Court erred in 
accepting a "waiver" of these procdures, which are 
mandatory and cannot be waived. /d. at 6-7. 
In contrast, the court in State v. Soke, No. 62908 (8th 
Dist. Ct. App., 7-15-93), upheld such a waiver. The court 
wrote: 
Defendant also maintains that there is no authority 
contained within R.C. Chapter 2151, or Juv. R. 30 which 
permits a defendant to waive bind over proceedings. 
We agree that there is no specific authority for waiver of 
a bind over hearing, but we note that there is likewise no 
prohibition for waiver of the hearing. 
Defendant also maintains that pursuant to the pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court in 
Kent v.. United States (1966), ... a hearing on the issue 
of the bind over is a critical phase and is mandatory. 
Critical phases, however, may be knowingly, compe-
tently and intelligently waived. /d. at 6-7. 
MENTAL AND PHYSICAL EXAMINATION 
Juvenile Rule 30(8) provides for a mental and physical 
examination. This examination may be waived, and refusal 
to submit to the examination constitutes a waiver. Juv. R. 
30(G); R.C. 2151.26(C) (waiver must be "competently and 
intelligently made"). 
Waiver 
In State ex rei. Doe v. Tracy, 51 Ohio App.3d 198, 555 
N.E.2d 674 (1988), the court ordered a mental examination 
pursuant to Rule 30. After this examination, the prosecution 
moved for a second mental examination by a psychologist 
of the state's choosing. The juvenile attempted to waive this 
examination but the court refused. When the juvenile, on 
advice of counsel, refused to answer questions at the sec-
ond examination, the court cited him for contempt. The 
appellate court upheld the juvenile's right to waive the 
examination: 
[The statute] makes it equally clear that the decision 
to submit to or waive the examination rests ultimately 
with the child. The only requirement is that any waiver 
must be competently and intelligently made. . . . 
Accordingly, where the child competently and intelli-
gently waives the mental and physical examination, the 
court must complete its investigation without it. Any 
attempt on the part of the court to secure such an 
examination over a valid waiver would be unreasonable 
and would constitute an abuse of discretion. /d. at 201. 
Constitutional Issues 
In State ex rei. a Juvenile v. Hoose, 43 Ohio App.3d 1 09, 
539 N.E.2d 704 (1988), the juvenile asserted his Fifth 
Amendment right with respect to a court ordered mental 
examination by the court psychiatrist. The court rejected 
this argument. 
In essence, the argument raised by counsel for peti-
tioner is that he faces a dilemma in advising his client I& 
on whether to submit to a mental examination by a 
court psychologist because of the potential use of any 
incriminating statements made by him during such 
examination. 
Contrary to petitioner's concern here, it is our view 
that any incriminating matter which might be obtained 
during the mental examination with the court psycholo-
gist pertaining to the relinquishment proceeding is 
expressly precluded from being used for anything other 
than the waiver determination itself. Juv. R. 32(8). 
Consequently, if the juvenile court decides to retain 
its jurisdiction, the relevant juvenile rule prevents the 
use of any statements made by petitioner during the 
course of the ensuing hearing there in determining the 
status of the charge or charges there. This provision in 
our judgment also bars the use of such statements if 
the juvenile is treated as an adult offender in the gen-
eral division of the common pleas court. /d. at 112. 
Citing Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the juvenile 
also moved for a private evaluation at the state's expense. 
In Ake the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a criminal defen-
dant had a due process right to a defense expert under 
some circumstances. The court of appeals ruled that Ake 
did not apply to transfer hearings because these hearings 
do not determine guilt or innocence, nor is liberty at stake. 
Hoose, 43 Ohio App.3d at 111 (citing State v. R.G.D., 527 
A.2d 834, 842 (N.J. 1987). 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
R.C. 2151.352 and Juvenile Rule 4(A) recognize the right 
to counsel at all juvenile court hearings. The right to coun-
sel at transfer hearings is also constitutionally required. In 
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Kent the U.S. Supreme Court stated that "counsel must be 
afforded to the child in waiver proceedings," 383 U.S. at 
562-63, and that "there is no place in our system of law for 
' reaching a result of such tremendous consequences ... 
(~};without effective assistance of counsel .... " /d. at 5~4. See 
''!"''also Kemplen v. Maryland, 428 F.2d 169, 175 {4th C1r. 1970); 
lnge v. Slayton, 395 F. Supp. 560, 566 {E.D. Va. 1975), 
appeal dismissed, 541 F.2d 277 {4th Cir.l976); James v. 
Cox, 323 F. Supp 15, 20 {E.D. Va.l971). 
Waiver 
Usually, the right to counsel may be waived. In Ohio, 
however, the right to counsel at a transfer hearing may not 
be waived. Juvenile Rule 3 provides that a child's "right to 
be represented by counsel at a hearing conducted pursuant 
to Juv. R. 30 may not be waived." 
Effective Assistance 
The right to counsel includes the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel. This is the rule regarding the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668 {1984) (Sixth Amendment requires reasonably 
effective assistance of counsel). The U.S. Supreme Court's 
references to "effective assistance" of counsel in Kent indi-
cates that the same rule applies to the due process right of 
counsel in transfer proceedings. See Geboy v. Gray, 471 
F.2d 575 {7th Cir. 1973){noting counsel showed a "notable 
lack of zeal" in attempting to find alternatives to transfer). 
The function of counsel at a transfer hearing is to chal-
lenge the evidence offered by the prosecution and to 
~· adduce evidence that the child is amenable to treatment i~ 
~~ the juvenile system. In Kent, the Court commented that "If 
the staff's submissions include materials which are suscep-
tible to challenge or impeachment, it is precisely the role of 
counsel to 'denigrate' such matter." 383 U.S. at 563. 
Another court has noted: "The child's advocate should 
search for a plan, or perhaps a range of plans, which may 
persuade the court that the welfare of the child and the 
safety of the community can be served without waiver." 
Haziel v. United States, 404 F.2d 1275, 1279 {D.C. Cir. 1968). 
For a discussion of counsel's role at the transfer hearing, 
see IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Counsel for Private 
Parties 161-68 (1980); Feld, Juvenile Court Legislative Reform 
and the Serious Young Offender: Dismantling the 
"Rehabilitative /dea/,"65 Minn. L. Rev.l67, 224-30 {1980). 
NOTICE 
R.C. 2151.26(D) and Juvenile Rule 30(C) require that writ-
ten notice of the time, place, and nature of the hearing be 
given to the parents or guardian and counsel at least three 
days prior to the hearing. 
In State v. Taylor, 26 Ohio App.3d 69, 498 N.E.2d 211 
(1985), the court ruled that the "notice of hearing require-
ments ... are mandatory requirements, which cannot be 
waived by the juvenile by failing to object to non-compli-
ance." /d. at 71. The presence of the defendant's sister at 
the hearing did not satisfy this requirement because she 
,
1> was not the legal custodian. The court also held that the 
notice requirement was jurisdictional: 'Tnhe juvenile court, 
failing to comply with the notice of hearing provisions of 
R.C. 2151.26, was without jurisdiction to bind the defendant 
over to the criminal, or general, division of the common 
pleas court and the latter was without jurisdiction to proceed 
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on the indictment against him." /d. at 72. 
In State v. Parks, 51 Ohio App.3d 194, 555 N.E.2d 671 
(1 988), the court distinguished Taylor. At the probable 
cause hearing a detective testified that the defendant's 
grandmother had told him that she was the legal custodian 
and guardian. Although the detective never asked for docu-
mentation, the court ruled that the "record thus supports 
that notice was properly made upon the defendant's legal 
custodian as required by law." /d. at 196. 
EXCLUSION OF PUBLIC 
Juvenile Rule 27(A) and R.C. 2151.35 provide for the 
exclusion of the general public from juvenile court hearings; 
only persons with a direct interest in the case must be per-
mitted to attend. However, in State ex rei. Fyffe v. Pierce, 
40 Ohio St.3d 8, 531 N.E.2d 673 (1988), the Supreme 
Court refused to issue a writ of prohibition to close a trans-
fer hearing. The Court pointed out that both the rule and 
the statute make closure discretionary. Moreover, the Court 
found an adequate remedy at law: "If tried as adults, they 
can move for change of venue to alleviate any unfairness 
that pretrial publicity may cause. If change of venue is 
denied, and relators are subsequently convicted, they can 
appeal." /d. at 9. 
In In re T.R., 52 Ohio St.3d 6, 556 N.E.2d 439 (1 990), 
cert. denied sub nom. Dispatch Printing Co. v. Solve, 498 
U.S. 958 (1 990), the Supreme Court again addressed the 
closure issue, albeit in a dependency case. Due to the 
need for confidentiality in dependency cases, the Court 
concluded that "there is no qualified right of public access to 
juvenile court proceedings to determine if a child is abused, 
neglected, or dependent, or to determine custody of a minor 
child." /d. at 17. These proceedings are neither presump-
tively open nor presumptively closed to the press and public. 
A trial court may close such a proceeding if, after hearing 
evidence and argument on the issue, it finds that: (1) there 
exists a reasonable and substantial basis for believing that 
public access could harm the child or endanger the fairness 
of the proceedings, and (2) the potential for harm outweighs 
the benefits of public access. !d. 
One juvenile court has concluded that "the holding of 
T.R., which provides that certain juvenile court proceedings 
are neither presumptively open nor presumptively closed, 
should be applied to both the preliminary and amenability 
hearings in Juv. R. 30 proceedings." In re D.R., 63 Ohio 
Misc.2d 273, 279, 626 N.E.2d 1120 (C.P. 1993). 
Another court ruled that "[p]ublic access ought to remain 
open to those portions of the bindover proceedings which 
directly relate to the nature of the crime alleged to have been 
committed. Therefore, the public will have access to the 
probable cause hearing." In re N.H., 63 Ohio Misc.2d 285, 
297, 626 N.E.2d 697 (C.P. 1992). The amenability phase 
was treated differently. "Certain portions of any amenability 
hearing ought to be closed, because some portions of such 
hearings often involve information about a child's psychologi-
cal, social and family histories .... " /d. at 298. 
EVIDENCE 
In many jurisdictions the rules of evidence are relaxed in 
transfer hearings because these hearings are considered 
dispositional in nature. See S. Davis, Rights of Juveniles 4-
17 (2d ed 1980). 
Ohio Rules of Evidence 
At least as a general rule, however, in Ohio the rules of 
evidence apply in transfer hearings. Evidence Rule 1 01 
provides that the Rules of Evidence "govern proceedings in 
the courts of this state and before court-appointed referees 
of this state .... " 
There is, however, an important exception: Evidence 
Rule IOI(C)(6) exempts from the Rules of Evidence proceed-
ings in which other rules prescribed by the Ohio Supreme 
Court govern evidentiary matters. Thus, where the Rules of 
Evidence are in conflict with any other procedural rule, the 
"other rule" prevails. For example, Juvenile Rule 32(A)(2) 
expressly permits the use of a social history in transfer pro-
ceedings, although much of the material contained in a 
social history would be inadmissible under the Rules of 
Evidence. Juvenile Rule 2(ii) defines the social history as 
"the personal and family history of a child or any other party 
to a juvenile proceeding and may include the prior record of 
the person with the juvenile court or any other court." 
Prior to the adoption of the Rules of Evidence, the Ohio 
Supreme Court had upheld the use of a social history at a 
transfer hearing, despite its hearsay character. State v. 
Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973), cert. 
denied, 414 U.S.II61 (1974). See also State v. Riggins, 68 
Ohio App.2d 1, 7, 426 N.E.2d 504, 509 (1980) ("The Ohio 
Supreme Court has held that hearsay evidence is admissi-
ble at a relinquishment proceeding in Juvenile Court in the 
form of psychiatric reports from the Ohio Youth Commission 
Juvenile Diagnostic Center."). 
In Carmichael, however, the Court also indicated that the 
psychiatrists and psychologists whose opinions appeared in 
the social history could have been called as witnesses: 
'TDhey were never called, nor was any effort made to call 
them by defense counsel, even though counsel had access 
to those documents for more than two months prior to the 
hearing." 35 Ohio St.2d at 3-4. 
Right of Confrontation 
The issue of whether the right of confrontation applies at 
a transfer hearing was raised in State v. Riggins, 68 Ohio 
App.2d 1, 426 N.E.2d 504 (1980). In that case, the defen-
dant contended that he was denied due process because 
he was deprived of the opportunity to confront the witness-
es against him, i.e., the confession of a codefendant was 
read into evidence by a police officer. The court overruled 
this objection because the defendant failed to provide a 
transcript to support his allegations. /d. at 7-8. See also 
People ex rei. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 352 N.Y.S.2d 561, affd, 
360 N.Y.S.2d 71 (App. Div.l974) (due process requires prob-
able cause determination be based on nonhearsay evi-
dence}. 
Experts 
Expert testimony concerning the juvenile's psychological 
condition and potential for treatment is admissible. E.g., 
State v. Watson, 47 Ohio St.3d 93, 94, 547 N.E.2d 1181 
(1989) ("At the hearing, the court clinic psychiatrist ... testi-
fied that appellant showed 'no evidence of any psychiatric 
disorder."'); State v. Parks, 51 Ohio App.3d 194, 197, 555 
N.E.2d 671 (1988) ("The social worker ... testified it would 
be doubtful that the appellant would be amenable to reha-
bilitation in a juvenile institution."). 
The juvenile court, however, "is not bound by the experts' 
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opinions in making its determination whether the defendant 
is amenable to rehabilitation." State v. Houston,! 70 Ohio 
App.3d 152, 156, 590 N.E.2d 839 (1990) (citing State v. 




The privilege against self-incrimination applies in transfer 
hearings. R.E.M v. State, 532 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1975). See also IJA-ABA Standards Relating to 
Transfer Between Courts 50 (1980). 
In Gault the U.S. Supreme Court held the privilege applic-
able to adjudicatory hearings. 387 U.S. at 55. In other cases, 
the Court has stated that the privilege is applicable in any 
proceeding "civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the 
answers might incriminate [a person] in future criminal pro-
ceedings." Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
By testifying at a transfer hearing, the child waives the 
privilege against self-incrimination. Whether the child's 
statement may later be used at a criminal trial or at an 
adjudicatory hearing is unclear. If his statements may be 
used against him at a later time, the child is placed in an 
untenable position. The juvenile must either give up the 
privilege or the right to be heard at the transfer hearing. 
The U.S. Supreme Court considered an analogous situation 
in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), which 
involved a similar choice facing criminal defendants in sup-
pression hearings: 
Thus, in this case [the defendant] was obliged either 
to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to 
be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, 
to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intoler- @ 
able that one constitutional right should have to be sur-
rendered in order to assert another. We therefore hold 
that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to 
suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his 
testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at 
trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection. 
/d. at 394. 
Several courts in other jurisdictions have applied this rea-
soning to transfer hearings: "[C]andid testimony by the 
juvenile at the fitness hearing should be encouraged to aid 
in the determination of where best to try the minor; fairness 
to the minor requires that this testimony not be given at the 
expense of the privilege against self-incrimination." Sheila 
0. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal Rptr 418, 420 (Cal. App.l981). 
Accordingly, statements made at transfer hearings have 
been held inadmissible at subsequent criminal trials and 
adjudicatory hearings. Bryan v. Superior Court, 498 P.2d 
1079, 1087 (Cal.l972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973); 
Commonwealth v. Ransom, 288 A.2d 762, 767 (Pa. 1972); 
Sheila 0. v. Superior Court, 178 Cal. Rptr. 418, 420 (Cal. App. 
1981) (except for impeachment). See also IJA-ABA 
Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts 50-51 (1980). 
In State ex rei. a Juvenile v. Hoose, 43 Ohio App.3d 1 09, 
539 N.E.2d 704 (1988), the court of appeals addressed a 
similar issue in the context of the mental examination: 
In essence, the argument raised by counsel for peti-
tioner is that he faces a dilemma in advising his client 
on whether to submit to a mental examination by a 
court psychologist because of the potential use of any 
incriminating statements made by him during such 
examination. 




that any incriminating matter which might be obtained 
during the mental examination with the court psycholo-
gist pertaining to the relinquishment proceeding is ex-
pressly precluded from being used for anything other 
than the waiver determination itself. Juv. R. 32(B). 
Consequently, if the juvenile court decides to retain 
jurisdiction, the relevant juvenile rule prevents the use of 
any statements made by petitioner during the course of 
the ensuing hearing there in determining the status of 
the charge or Charges there. This provision in our judg-
ment also bars the use of such statements if the juvenile 
is treated as an adult offender in the general division of 
the common pleas court. /d. at 112. 
It is unclear whether this rationale also -applies to the 
juvenile's statements at the hearing. 
' 
ACCESS TO REPORTS 
Juvenile Rule 32(C) provides for the right to inspect a 
social history or report of a mental or physical examination 
a reasonable time prior to the transfer hearing. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Kent held that counsel had a right of 
access to social service records. The Court left no doubt 
that the right of inspection was intended to permit counsel 
to challenge the accuracy of these reports: 
[l]f the staff's submissions include materials which 
are susceptible to challenge or impeachment, it is pre-
cisely the role of counsel to "denigrate" such matter. 
There is no irrebuttable presumption of accuracy 
attached to staff reports. If a decision on waiver is "crit-
ically important" it is equally of "critical importance" that 
the material submitted to the judge ... be subjected .. 
. to examination, criticism and refutation. While the 
Juvenile Court judge may, of course, receive ex parte 
analyses and recommendations from his staff, he may 
not, for purposes of a decision on waiver, receive and 
rely upon secret information, whether emanating from 
his staff or otherwise. 383 U.S. at 563. 
STATEMENT OF REASONS 
RC 2151.26(F) and Juvenile Rule 30(H) require the court 
to state reasons if it decides to transfer the child. The U.S. 
Supreme Court in Kent also required a statement of the 
reasons: 
Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court 
should review. It should not be remitted to assump-
tions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons 
motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement 
of the relevant facts. It may not "assume" that there are 
adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that "full 
investigation" has been made. Accordingly, we hold 
that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accom-
pany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or 
considerations therefor. We do not read the statute as 
requiring that this statement must be formal or that it 
should necessarily include conventional findings of fact. 
But the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate 
that the statutory requirement of "full investigation" has 
been met; and that the question has received the care-
ful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set 
forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to 
permit meaningful review. 383 U.S. at 561. 
In State v. Newton, No. F-82-17 (6th Dist. Ct. App., 6-10-
83), the court held: 
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Mere recitation of the conclusory language set forth 
in Juv. R. 30(C)(I) and (2) is not sufficient. Conclusions 
are not reasons, as contemplated by Juv. R. 30(G). The 
"reasonable grounds" for the court's belief that a juve-
nile is not amenable to rehabilitation and that the com-
munity's safety may require his legal restraint must be 
spelled out with reasonable specificity. Stated different-
ly, Juv. R. 30(G) necessitates findings of fact from which 
to determine the prerequisites in Juv. R. 30(C)(I) and (2) 
and upon which to base the transfer order. /d. at 7. 
However, in State v. Douglas, 20 Ohio St.3d 34, 485 
N.E.2d 711,713 (1985), the Court ruled: 
Neither R.C. 2151.25 nor Juv. R. 30 requires the juve-
nile court to make written findings as to the five factors 
listed in Juv. R. 30(E) [current (F) which lists 6 factors]. 
The rule simply requires the court to consider these fac-
tors in making its determination on the amenability 
issue. Although the better practice would be to address 
each factor, as long as sufficient credible evidence per-
taining to each factor exists in the record before the 
court, the bind-over order should not be reversed in the 
absence of an abuse of discretion. /d. at 36 (emphasis 
added). 
Courts in other jurisdictions have insisted upon specific 
reasons for transfer. See Summers v. State, 230 N.E.2d 
320, 325 (lnd.l967); Risner v. Commonwealth, 508 S.W.2d 
775 (Ky.l974); In re Heising, 565 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Ore. App. 
1977); Knott v. Langlois, 231 A.2d 767, 770 (R.I.I967). See 
a/so IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between 
Courts 33-34 (1980). 
RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT 
Juvenile Rule 37(A) provides for the right to a complete 
record of all juvenile court hearings upon request. 
Moreover, one Ohio court, citing due process and equal 
protection grounds, has held that an indigent juvenile has a 
right to a transcript in transfer proceedings. State v. Ross, 
23 Ohio App.2d 215, 216-17, 262 N.E.2d 427, 429 (1970). 
The importance of a transcript is illustrated by State v. 
Riggins, 68 Ohio App.2d I, 426 N.E.2d 504 (1980), in which 
the appellate court overruled an alleged error at a transfer 
hearing because the "appellant has failed to provide this 
court with a transcript of the hearing before the Juvenile 
Court at which this evidence was presented." /d. at 7-8. 
See a/so F. Bailey & H. Rothblatt, Handling Juvenile 
Delinquency Cases 183 (1982) ("insist that the proceedings 
be transcribed"). 
POS~TRANSFERISSUES 
Retention of Jurisdiction 
If the juvenile court decides to retain jurisdiction, it must 
schedule a hearing on the merits. Juv R 30(0). One court 
has stated that a juvenile judge is not disqualified from pre-
siding at an adjudicatory hearing because of his involve-
ment in a prior transfer hearing. In re Terry H, I O.B.R. 377, 
378 (C.P. 1982). 
In contrast, the IJA-ABA Standards recognize a child's 
right to disqualify the transfer hearing judge from participat-
ing in subsequent proceedings: "No matter how fair the 
waiver judge may be in subsequent proceedings, an 
impression of unfairness will exist." IJA-ABA Standards 
Relating to Transfer-Between Courts 52 (1980). See a/so 
Donald L. v. Superior Court, 498 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Cal. 1972) 
("[l]f the referee or judge who hears the issue of fitness 
decides that the minor should be retained in the juvenile 
court, he may not thereafter properly preside at a contest-
ed hearing on the issue of jurisdiction."). 
Transfer of Jurisdiction 
If the juvenile court decides to transfer jurisdiction, it will 
set the terms and conditions for release of the child in 
accordance with Criminal Rule 46. If the juvenile is in 
detention he may be transferred to the appropriate officer or 
detention facility in accordance with the law governing the 
detention of adults. RC 2151.312(A). 
The criminal court to which jurisdiction has been trans-
ferred may not "review the factual findings of the juvenile 
court on the issue of amenability." State v. Whiteside, 6 
Ohio App.3d 30,36-37, 452 N.E.2d 332, 339 (1982). 
Once a child is transferred, a grand jury may indict for any 
offense appropriate under the facts; the grand jury is not 
limited to the charges filed in juvenile court. State v. 
Adams, 69 Ohio St.2d 120, 124-25, 431 N.E.2d 326 (1982) (a 
grand jury does not exceed its authority by returning indict-
ments on charges which were not originally filed in juvenile 
court); State v. Klingenberger, 113 Ohio St. 418, 425, 149 N.E. 
395, 397 (1925). 
Moreover, a criminal defendant's statutory right to a 
speedy trial does not commence until the juvenile court 
relinquishes jurisdiction. State v. Bickerstaff, 1 0 Ohio St. 3d 
62, 67, 461 N.E.2d 892 (1984); State ex rei. Williams v. 
Court of Common Pleas, 42 Ohio St.2d 433, 434, 329 
N.E.2d 680, 681 (1975). 
APPEALS 
In Ohio a juvenile court order transferring jurisdiction to 
the criminal courts is not a final appealable .order. In re 
Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84, 314 N.E.2d 158 (1974). Accord 
State ex rei. Torres v. Simmons, 68 Ohio St.2d 118, 428 
N.E.2d 862 (1981 ). Thus, a transfer order may be chal-
lenged on appeal only after trial and conviction in the crimi-
nal courts. Similarly, a writ of prohibition may not be used 
to challenge a transfer order. State ex rei. Torres v. 
Simmons, 68 Ohio St.2d 118, 428 N.E.2d 862 (1981). 
Although a number of jurisdictions permit appeals of trans-
fer orders, the Ohio rule appears to be the majority rule. 
See IJA-ABA Standards Relating to Transfer Between 
Courts 53 (1980). 
The Ohio Supreme Court has provided the following rea-
sons for its position: 
To permit interlocutory review of such an order would 
obviously delay the prosecution of any proceeding in 
either the juvenile or the criminal division, with the 
result that the prospect of a just disposition would be 
jeopardized. In either proceeding the primary issue is 
the ascertainment of innocence or guilt of the person 
charged. To permit interlocutory review would subordi-
nate that primary issue and defer its consideration 
while the question of the punishment appropriate for a 
suspect whose guilt has not yet been ascertained is 
being litigated in reviewing courts. We are unwilling to 
sanction such a procedure. In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 
84, 86, 314 N.E.2d 158, 159 (1974). 
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Criticism 
There is, however, a serious disadvantage to this rule. 
The time consumed during the prosecution of the case in 
criminal court and during the appellate process may place 
the defendant beyond the age jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court. In this event, an appellate court that finds error in a 
transfer proceeding must either free the improperly trans-
ferred individual, because neither juvenile nor criminal court 
has jurisdiction, or reconstruct the transfer process to deter-
mine whether a hearing free from error would have resulted 
in transfer. The difficulty with this procedure is that the 
reconstructed hearing must "attempt to imagine" the child as 
he was at the time of the original transfer hearing. IJA-ABA 
Standards Relating to Transfer Between Courts 53 (1980). 
DOUBLE JEOPARD 
The United States Supreme Court has applied double 
jeopardy principles to bindover proceedings. In Breed v. 
Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed 
a California procedure that permitted transfer after a child 
had been found delinquent in an adjudicatory hearing. The 
Court held that this procedure violated the double jeopardy 
clause: "We believe it is simply too late in the day to con-
clude ... that a juvenile is not put in jeopardy at a proceed-
ing whose object is to determine whether he has committed 
acts that violate a criminal law and whose potential conse-
quences include both the stigma inherent in such a determi-
nation and the deprivation of liberty for many years." /d. at 
529. 
In a footnote, however, the Court distinguished the 
California procedure from a transfer procedure requiring 
only a finding of probable cause: "We note that nothing 
decided today forecloses States from requiring, as a pre-
requisite to the transfer of a juvenile, substantial evidence 
that he committed the offense charged, so long as the 
showing required is not made in an adjudicatory proceed-
ing .... The instant case is not one in which the judicial 
determination was simply a finding of, e.g., probable cause. 
Rather, it was an adjudication that respondent had violated 
a criminal statute." /d. at 538 n.l8. 
In Sims v. Engle, 619 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
450 U.S. 936 (1981), the Sixth Circuit held that the Ohio 
transfer procedure, as it then existed, suffered from the 
same deficiencies that marked the California procedure in 
Breed. According to the court, this procedure violated the 
double jeopardy guarantee. 
The Ohio statute was amended after Sims. Unlike the 
former procedure, the present transfer procedure requires 
only a finding of probable cause and not a determination of 
delinquency. The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitution-
ality of this procedure: "We reject the contention that the 
introduction of evidence of probable cause to believe 
appellant committed the alleged offense without more, 
transformed the hearing into an adjudicatory proceeding." 
Keener v. Taylor, 640 F..2d 839, 841-42 (6th Cir. 1981). 
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